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Abstract 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is a highly prevalent goal of public policy in many countries around the world. 
Convincing people to drive more fuel-efficient (“eco-driving”) can contribute substantially to this goal. However, 
there is a lack of scientific studies on the effects of individual monetary and non-monetary incentives for eco-driving, 
especially in organizational settings and with regards to demonstrating causality, e.g., by using controlled 
experiments. We address this gap with a six months long controlled natural field experiment and introduce a 
monetary and a non-monetary reward for eco-driving to drivers of light commercial vehicles in different branches of 
a logistics company. Our results show an average reduction of fuel consumption of 5% due to a tangible non-
monetary reward and suggest only a small reduction of the average fuel consumption in the equivalent monetary 
reward treatment. Building on the extant research on psychological determinants of transport behavior and economic 
incentives, we give possible explanations for the observed behavior and the potential superiority of non-monetary 
rewards over pure money. Policy implications for private and public actors are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
The road transport sector plays an important role in world energy use and emissions of greenhouse 
gases [1], with up to 30% to 40% of road sector CO2 emissions coming from road freight transport [2]. In 
addition, the share of road freight transport is predicted to increase even further in the future [3] [4]. It is 
undisputed that decisions on the operational level, i.e., on the driving style have a large influence on the 
fuel consumption [3] [4], with fuel-efficient driving or “eco-driving” reducing the fuel consumption 
between 5% to as much as 62 % [6] [7] [8]. Despite this large potential, there are several gaps in the 
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current state of research on energy-efficient behavior and eco-driving that can hinder an effective policy 
formulation to influence driving behavior and, thus, increase fuel efficiency in the road freight sector. 
First, even though research on pro-environmental behavior in organizational settings should have a 
high priority because of the large impact of organizational actions on the environment [9], we observe a 
lack of studies on energy-efficient behavior in the workplace. While research has identified a number of 
energy-saving interventions to be effective at changing behavior in the residential sector [10], only few 
studies focus on changing energy consumption behavior in an organizational context [11] [12] [13]. 
Second, much of the evidence on interventions to increase pro-environmental behavior in general and 
eco-driving in particular is based on aggregate statistics, narrative type case studies, or very small sample 
sizes [14] [15]. Thus, there is a need for a systematic and statistically reliable evaluation of interventions 
to change driving behavior, using, e.g., controlled experiments to clearly demonstrate causality, especially 
in the transport sector [16]. Finally, to our knowledge there is no scientifically sound evaluation of the 
effects of monetary and non-monetary rewards for eco-driving. 
We address this gap by conducting a natural field experiment on the effects of monetary and non-
monetary incentives for eco-driving, one of the very few studies within transport research employing a 
natural field experiment to demonstrate causality [16]. Specifically, we introduce a monetary and a non-
monetary reward for eco-driving to drivers of light commercial vehicles in different branches of a 
German logistics company and test their efficacy over a period of six months. To our knowledge, this is 
the first study that analyzes empirically the isolated effects of incentives for eco-driving on fuel 
consumption in a real-world setting. 
2. Incentives for eco-driving 
2.1. Eco-driving 
The main characteristics of a fuel-efficient and, thus, economically and ecologically beneficial driving 
style, often called “eco-driving” [7], can be summarized as follows [5] [17] [18]: (1) Accelerating 
moderately and changing gear optimally (shifts up between 2000 and 2500 revolutions per minute), (2) 
keeping a safe distance from other vehicles and anticipating traffic flow and signals to avoid 
unnecessarily sharp breaking and acceleration, (3) driving at appropriate speeds (adhering to speed limits) 
and maintaining an even driving pace (using cruise control where appropriate), and (4) avoiding excessive 
idling. For the field experiment, this qualitative view had to be transferred into a measurable definition. 
We approximate the degree of eco-driving as achieving an average fuel consumption below an individual 
reference value (in liters per 100 kilometers). This reference value was calculated in a way that balances 
between different drivers’ situations, e.g., different levels of eco-driving in the past (see chapter 3). 
Previous studies found that eco-driving can reduce the fuel consumption of passenger vehicles and 
light commercial vehicles between 5% to 62% [6] [7] [8] [19]. While the exact saving potential depends 
on the specific circumstances, e.g., car type, route, and benchmark, a majority of the studies estimates the 
saving potential between of 5 to 25%. 
2.2. Determinants of driving behavior 
According to Gardner (2009) [20] the Theory of Planned Behavior is the most widely applied model of 
cognitive determinants of car use. It assumes that „behaviour is most closely determined by an intention 
to act, which summarises motivation.“ [20] 
However, research in behavioral economics also found that intention is not necessarily a good 
predictor of future behavior because individuals cannot predict their behavior in a context that is very 
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different to the state in which their intentions are elicited [16] [21]. Gardner (2009) [20] also confirms the 
finding that motivational models neglect the „repetitive nature of travel mode decisions“ which may 
become habituated and automated [22]. 
Assuming that driving behavior of professional drivers is mostly habitual due to its repetitive nature, 
interventions for eco-driving in a company fleet should be designed such that they take into account the 
limited predecisional information search and the lack of deliberation during habitual decision-making. 
The key to changing the driving behavior may be to find interventions that interrupt or disturb the 
habitual car use [23] [24], e.g., by making the automatic execution of the habit impossible or unattractive 
and by facilitating a deliberate choice of driving behavior in some way [25]. The experimental studies of 
[26] and [27] showed that an economic incentive (in their cases a free one-month bus pass or travel card) 
can be an appropriate measure to disrupt driving habits. Thus, economic incentives may be sufficient to 
change driving behavior by disrupting habits and permitting concomitant motivation change because they 
restructure the decisional context. 
Hypothesis 1. Economic incentives for fuel-efficient driving induce eco-driving and, thus, lead to a 
reduction of fuel consumption. 
However, there are many different types of economic incentives that have potentially different 
(non-)effects on the driving style of fleet drivers. A further differentiation is necessary. 
2.3. Monetary and non-monetary incentives for eco-driving 
While the impact of an incentive certainly also depends on its specific characteristics, i.e., structure, 
magnitude and timing [28], behavioral psychology generally ascribes stronger effects to rewards than 
punishments [29]. We follow this notion and analyze the two major types of positive incentives or 
rewards: monetary (cash) and non-monetary rewards (non-cash). 
Several meta-studies review the empirical evidence on the use of incentives in firms and in other 
settings, and demonstrate that monetary incentives lead to a performance increase in many different 
settings [30] [31] [32] [33]. Following rational economic theory, employees should always favor 
monetary incentives (cash) over non-monetary incentives because of the option value of money [34]. 
Furthermore, providing non-monetary incentives is more difficult for employers than offering a monetary 
incentive because it is difficult to match non-monetary incentives with the preferences of all employees 
[35]. In line with this view, Condly et al. (2003) [30] find in their meta-study that the performance gains 
for money (27%) were about twice the average gains produced by tangible non-monetary incentives 
(13%). 
But they also note that their findings have to be viewed with caution because only few studies on non-
monetary incentives were available and they could not determine the actual cash value of the non-
monetary incentives that were studied. Still today, only few studies provide an academically sound and 
direct comparison of monetary and non-monetary incentives with equal monetary value [34]. However, 
several studies have demonstrated that non-monetary incentives can in fact have a stronger positive effect 
on performance than equivalent monetary incentives [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39]. Even when employees 
expressed a preference for cash incentives when asked directly, non-monetary incentives have proven to 
be more effective at improving the same employees’ performance [34] [37]. 
Since the monetary value of the provided incentives in this study is not exceptionally high, we 
hypothesize that the above described soft advantages of the tangible non-monetary incentive will result in 
a higher fuel efficiency than the equivalent monetary incentive. 
Hypothesis 2. Tangible non-monetary incentives for fuel-efficient driving induce stronger eco-driving 
and, thus, lead to a higher reduction of fuel consumption than monetary incentives with equivalent cash 
value. 
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3. Experimental design and procedure 
We conducted a natural field experiment with employees (n = 86) of a German logistics company who 
distribute small consumable products and service the points of sale of the company’s customers with light 
commercial vehicles. 
We employed a between-subjects experimental design with a control group without any incentive and 
two incentive treatment groups (a monetary incentive and a tangible non-monetary incentive). Since 
discussions between drivers of the different groups had to be avoided in order to prevent irritations and 
confounding effects, drivers could not be assigned randomly to one of the groups. Instead, since the 
company has three different branches in three different states with similar fleets and processes, the same 
treatment was introduced to all drivers of a certain branch (control group: n=24; monetary incentive 
group: n=22; non-monetary incentive group: n=40). The branch with likely the highest fuel saving 
potential was chosen as control group. 
Drivers of the two incentive treatments were rewarded for eco-driving, i.e., for an average fuel 
consumption below an individual reference value (in liters per 100 kilometers). This reference value was 
calculated individually by the company for every driver as the mean of an individual past fuel 
consumption value and the average past fuel consumption value of all drivers with the same vehicle type 
in the same branch (so, e.g., drivers who had already kept a fuel-efficient driving habit before the 
experiment would have a reference value which is higher than their past individual average consumption). 
If a driver realized a fuel consumption value below the reference value during the six months of the 
experiment, the mathematical savings in fuel costs were calculated and distributed evenly between the 
driver and the company. The drivers in the monetary incentive treatment received the incentive value in 
cash. The drivers in the tangible non-monetary incentive treatment received a voucher, worth the 
calculated incentive value, for cinema, wellness, social events, and restaurant visits depending on the 
driver’s individual preferences (combinations were possible). 
Three months before the introduction of the incentives the company started to log the individual fuel 
consumption data on a monthly basis. By the end of June 2013, the monetary and the tangible non-
monetary incentives were introduced to the drivers of the respective treatment branches. Over the 
following six months until the end of 2013, the company collected individual fuel consumption data on a 
monthly basis. 
4. Results 
A comparison of the branches’ average fuel consumptions before the treatment and during the 6 
months long treatment period shows high differences between the branches (see table 1). The non-
monetary treatment group exhibits a strongly significant and much higher reduction (11.9%) of the 
average fuel consumption than the other two groups in the treatment period. 
 
Table 1. Summary of all experimental groups’ average fuel consumptions before and during the experiment 
 
Fuel consumption (l/100km) 
Experimental group / branch HY1 2013 HY2 2013 Delta (%)a 
Non-monetary treatment 9.85 8.68 -11.9%*** 
Monetary treatment 8.83 8.53 -3.4%** 
Control 10.24 9.85 -3.8% 
ALL GROUPS 9.63 8.93 -7.3%*** 
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for mean differences: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Since differences in fuel consumption between the branches have already existed before the 
experiment, this reduction cannot be attributed solely to the treatment effect without considering other 
potentially influential factors. To analyze whether the monetary or the non-monetary intervention affected 
the drivers’ fuel consumption after controlling for other potential influences, we estimate the following 
panel data model with random effects and robust standard errors: 
 
Consumptionit = £1*Monetaryit + £2*Non_monetaryit + Xit*¤ + vit with vit = αi+ϵit, t = (1,2,…,9)  (1) 
 
where Consumptionit is the driver’s average fuel consumption in month t in liters per 100 kilometers. 
Monetaryit and Non_monetaryit are indicators for whether the driver is part of one of the treatment groups 
with the monetary or the tangible non-monetary incentive. Xit denote observable control variables (e.g., 
vehicle type, demographic variables, and weather variables). αi is the unobserved heterogeneity (varying 
across drivers but constant over time) and ϵit is the idiosyncratic error that varies across drivers and time. 
 
Table 2. Estimation results 
 consumption consumption consumption consumption consumption consumption consumption 
Monetary 
-0.473*** -0.569*** -0.648*** -0.346*** -0.322 -0.327 -0.340 
(0.108) (0.136) (0.128) (0.130) (0.201) (0.201) (0.216) 
Non-monetary 
-0.550*** -0.673*** -0.757*** -0.738*** -0.704*** -0.719*** -0.488** 
(0.118) (0.149) (0.158) (0.177) (0.233) (0.228) (0.224) 
Introduction 
presence 
 0.169 0.245* 0.232 0.216 0.240* 0.256* 
 (0.146) (0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.142) (0.144) 
Vehicle: VW 
Transporter 
  -0.152 -0.056 -0.0429 -0.00378 -0.00284- 
  (0.186) (0.170) (0.172) (0.179) (0.180) 
Vehicle: Peugeot 
Boxer 
  1.187*** 1.805*** 1.818*** 1.843*** 1.842*** 
  (0.276) (0.267) (0.269) (0.252) (0.252) 
Location: branch 
2 
   -0.341 -0.361 -0.382 -0.648* 
   (0.245) (0.271) (0.263) (0.332) 
Location: branch 
3 
   -0.792*** -0.804*** -0.789*** -0.842*** 
   (0.198) (0.230) (0.233) (0.285) 
June 
    0.523*** 0.521*** -0.292 
    (0.182) (0.183) (1.161) 
August 
    0.645** 0.638** -0.629 
    (0.254) (0.253) (1.541) 
October 
    0.509** 0.503** 0.232 
    (0.253) (0.252) (0.429) 
Age 
     -0.0148** -0.0147** 
     (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Vocational 
training 
     0.331 0.334 
     (0.362) (0.361) 
Weather 
      -0.0032*** 
      (0.00109) 
Constant 
9.368*** 9.372*** 9.146*** 9.423*** 9.161*** 9.507*** 8.574*** 
(0.131) (0.131) (0.167) (0.174) (0.238) (0.425) (1.303) 
R² 0.0579 0.0610 0.262 0.280 0.309 0.321 0.324 
***, **, * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. The numbers in parentheses represent robust standard errors. 
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The estimation results of the average treatment effects and the effects of other independent variables 
are reported in the table 2. Since we find no significant reduction effect of the monetary incentive, H1 is 
only partly supported. However, we find a significant effect of the tangible non-monetary incentive on the 
drivers’ fuel consumption (p<0.030) with a coefficient of -0.488 liters per 100 kilometer (full model 7). 
Compared to the overall fuel consumption in the half year before the introduction of the incentives, this 
denotes a significant average reduction of the fuel consumption by 5% due to the tangible non-monetary 
incentive. This effect remains strongly significant independent of the inclusion or exclusion of 
explanatory variables. 
At the same time, the drivers’ average total distance travelled over the six months treatment period in 
the treatment branches was even lower compared to the same period one year earlier. In addition, there 
was no significant increase in the drivers’ average travel distance after the experiment. Hence, we find no 
evidence for a potentially counterproductive influence of the rebound effect in this setting. 
These results indicate that the tangible non-monetary incentive for fuel-efficient driving induced 
stronger eco-driving and, thus, lead to a higher reduction of fuel consumption than the monetary incentive 
with equivalent cash value. Thus, H2 is supported. 
Estimations with OLS and pooled OLS provide very similar results. A fixed effects estimation 
provides largely comparable results as well, but generally with a bit lower p values and coefficients for 
the treatment effects. A difference-in-differences estimation with average fuel consumption values from 
the first and second half of 2013 confirms our overall results as well. These results indicate that our 
findings are largely robust to changes in the applied regression model. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the effects of economic incentives for eco-driving on fuel 
consumption in an organizational setting. Our study is the first to systematically analyze and compare a 
monetary and a non-monetary incentive for eco-driving with a natural field experiment. Generally, we 
observe a reduction of the average fuel consumption following the introduction of economic incentives. 
Specifically, we find a significant reduction of fuel consumption of, on average, 5% due to a tangible 
non-monetary incentive and an average reduction of 3.5% in the equivalent monetary incentive treatment 
that is only close to significance. 
Building on previous studies on the role of habits in transport behavior, we conclude that especially 
non-monetary elements of an incentive can lead to a significant interruption of the habitual car use and 
facilitate a deliberate choice of driving behavior to increase eco-driving and, thus, lower fuel consumption 
and greenhouse gas emissions. Our research indicates that more emphasis on the fun of achieving a higher 
fuel efficiency, a more emotional response to non-monetary incentives, and a higher frequency of 
thinking about non-monetary incentives might play a role in the stronger effect of the tangible non-
monetary incentive in comparison to an equivalent monetary incentive. 
While the results of our field experiment certainly cannot be generalized without limitations, our study 
makes several important contributions. The results show that certain types of incentives for eco-driving 
should be considered by policy makers and the transport industry as a viable option to reduce fuel 
consumption in the future. Furthermore, we contribute to the important stream of literature analyzing the 
efficacy of monetary and non-monetary incentives for energy conservation [10] [40]. In addition, our 
study is arguably the first within transportation research to apply a natural field experiment to 
demonstrate causality in the evaluation of interventions to change driving behavior [16]. Thus, it serves as 
template for future studies evaluating the efficacy of energy efficiency measures in the transport sector 
with controlled experiments [41]. 
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